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Since the end of the 1990s, Brazilian government policies have given incentives to 
strengthening linkages between firms and the science a d technology infrastructure (research 
institutions) for promoting innovation and, consequntly, for improving the country's 
competitiveness. The Brazilian government put forward innovation as the focus for policies 
when launched in 2004 the actual “Industrial, Technology and Trade Policies”. Since then, 
Government agencies and research institutions have incr ased their role of articulating, 
modelling programs, financing and diffusing technological knowledge, especially for the 
segment of small and medium-sized firms (SMEs).  
 
This set of industrial and S&T policies has a different focus when compared to those 
implemented by the military government (1960s-middle 1980s) and even after that phase, 
during the 1990s, when the government decision in relation to an explicit industrial policy 
was “not having an industrial policy is better”. The military government had given a strong 
role for multinationals and state government firms as the primary sources of technology 
transfer to the local SMEs development. These policies have followed the international path 
in terms of objective, which was import substitution industrialization; although there are 
several differences among countries in the way theyhave been implemented. Some general 
examples of these differences can be observed when comparing the South Korean policies for 
industrialization during the 1970s and 1980s and the Brazilian ones.  
 
South Korean policies followed the Japanese by controlli g imports and stimulating exports; 
regulating capital and technology transfer from abro d; investing in increasing the number of 
engineers; and giving incentives to the development of technological capabilities in Korean 
firms. Large private Korean corporations had an important role in the Korean policies.  
 
Brazilian policies were towards incentives for increasing foreign direct investment, building 
up industrial sectors in order to be self sufficient a d creating government owned firms in 
strategic areas. There were also investments in the education system and in research 
institutions, as well as research and development activities at the government owned firms. 
The government owned firms and multinational corporati ns played an important role in 
building up a diversified industrial system. These firms have focused mostly in the Brazilian 
internal market and little in exports.  
 
In an attempt to understand the role of national buyers, foreign buyers and research 
institutions (universities and technological centres) to Brazilian SMEs development, this 
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paper explains the differences in activities carried out among them to the accumulation of 
technological capabilities experienced by these SMEs. The study makes the connection 
between activities undertaken and their impact in terms of technological change implemented 
and level of technological capability acquired by the SMEs. Additionally, it also distinguishes 
this connection over time, aiming at identifying if there were any accumulation of 
technological capabilities experienced by the SMEs. The main question is whether there are 
any differences in the role of the national and foreign buyers compared with research 
institutions to the accumulation of technological cpabilities or not.  
 
This issue is particularly addressed in the aeronautic sector because it is one of the most 
innovative and robust in the country - this sector was responsible by 3.1% of the Brazilian 
total exports in 2005, which was US$118.308 million (FOB). Moreover the Brazilian 
Aeronautic firm, Embraer, is one of the largest passenger airplane manufacturer worldwide 
with focus on commercial, executive and defence aviation. . Embraer was founded in 1969 by 
the Brazilian military government and was managed by the militaries until 1994 when it was 
privatised. Although it is successful in achieving ternational competitiveness on its specific 
market segment for regional jets flying from 45 to 108 passengers, Brazil has not being able 
to consolidate the supply chain of Embraer within the national borders. There are few 
Brazilian firms supplying to Embraer and to some of the foreign first tier suppliers of 
Embraer. In fact, the import content increased from approximately 68% in the 1980s 
(Dagnino and Proença, 1989) to approximately 95% in the 1990s (Bernardes, 2000a). 
Therefore, there is a question about how the local Br zilian suppliers are maintaining 
themselves in the competitive supply chain of Embraer. The findings show that they are 
improving their innovative capabilities in two directions: by strengthening their basic 
innovative capability regarding production processes and, in few cases, by upgrading to 
intermediate and advanced levels of innovative capability. The relationship with Embraer, 
foreign buyers and Brazilian research institutions are the main sources of knowledge for the 
technological learning experienced by these Brazilian suppliers that are “surviving” in the 
supply chain of Embraer.  
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. We examine the literature about system of innovation 
and technological capability accumulation in the next section. Following that, the Brazilian 
Aeronautic Sector is briefly described in section 3 and the method is explained in section 4. 
Then, reflections about the case of Brazilian small and medium size firms (SMEs) 
accumulation of technological capabilities are made in section 5 and final comments are in 
section 6. 
 
2. Sectoral System of Innovation and Technological Capability: analytical 
framework 
 
2.1 The System of Innovation Approach 
Systems of Innovation are the network of government and non-government agencies, science 
and technology institutes, educational organisations, and firms, among other organisations, 
which flows influenced the direction and extent of innovation. The country’s macroeconomic 
and industrial policies, international regulations, market governance, and socio-cultural 
institutions influence the network dynamism and trajectory. The interaction between the 
former and the latter has influenced knowledge accumulation and learning processes in firms 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982; Freeman, 1987; Nelson and Rosenberg, 1993; Cooke et al, 1997; 
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Hodgson, 1999).  For understanding this issue, many authors have focused in distinct but 
inter-related areas of systems of innovation. Some f these areas are related to technological, 
sectoral, national, regional, financial, and political, among others, systems of innovation.  
It worth to mention that the analytical framework utilised in this paper focuses on examining 
the evolution of a sector, specifically its dynamics and transformation over time, regarding to 
technological development and to linkages among actors. This approach refers, thus, to the 
sectoral system of innovation idea. Although many researches have been done about this 
theme, less comprehension exists on the relation among actors in a sectoral system and 
technological capabilities accumulation (Malerba, 200 ).  
Before focusing on the sectoral system of innovation, it is relevant for the debate to make few 
considerations about technological change and the broad system of innovation literature. First, 
the theory that technological change is not an isolated process emerged as an attempted to 
explain innovative behaviour and the consequent technological capabilities accumulation and 
evolution in firms. Second, technological change is a consequence of the capability of firms in 
managing and generating innovation as well as in acquiring and diffusing technological 
knowledge (Freeman, 1987). In fact, the development of such capability is a process that 
requires that a given firm interact with other firms, research institutions, universities and 
funding institutions, among other organisations. Third, government policies have an important 
role in regulate and co-ordinate the pace (quantity) and nature (quality) of the development of 
technological capabilities. This explains partly the differences of industrial development 
between countris, regions and sectors; other factors that may influence the differences are the 
specific endowments and characteristics where firms are located (De Ferranti and Perry, 
2002). Differences between the three aspects of technical evolution turn on to influence the 
trajectory of countries for catching up industrialized countries (Viotti, 2002; Freeman, 1987). 
Generally, researchers focus their analysis in two ways. First, they observe differences among 
countries and regions (national or regional systems) regarding the type of exported products, 
investments in R&D, investments in education and training, science and technology 
capabilities, industrial structure, and patents, among other variables (Viotti, 2002; Cassiolato 
and Lastres, 1999; Cooke et al, 1997; Patel  and Pavitt, 1994; Nelson and Rosenberg, 1993; 
Lundvall, 1992; Freeman, 1987). Second, they examine technological diffusion and 
development within industrial networks (technological or sectoral systems) (Malerba, 2002; 
Breschi and Malerba, 1997; Carlsson, 1995; Carlsson and Jacobson, 1994).  
Viotti (2002) considers that industrializing countries are adopters of technological knowledge 
from developed countries and their firms may develop incremental innovations according to 
their capabilities to do so. However these firms are not developing innovations in the same 
sense that Lundvall (1992) or Schumpeter (Malerba, 2002) defined. In fact, Viotti refers that 
innovation in these countries are not really innovati n to the world market but they are 
adaptations to attend the specificities of industrializing countries  He compares the case of 
South Korea and Brazil and concludes that the former is an active learning system and the 
later is a passive learning system. Active learning system is characterized by the capability to 
improve and adapt technologies while a passive learning system is characterized by the 
capability to adopt technologies.  
The conclusion that the Brazilian System of Innovation as other Latin American countries  are 
not innovative is supported by other researches. Casiol to and Lastres (1999), Katz (2000, 
2001) and Bernardes (2000) examined the technological behaviour of national and foreign 
firms and the influences of macroeconomic policies and industrialisation strategies defined by 
governments on this behaviour.  Their common argument is that the Brazilian system is 
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fragmented lacking long term industrial policies. Moreover, they refer that local firms have 
lacked innovative capabilities to succeed in competing in the world market. 
Although there is lack of explicit long-term industrial policies, some researchers refer that the 
Brazilian System of Innovation is heavily influenced by the government development policies 
(Oliveira, 2005; Marques, 2004; Cassiolato and Lastres, 1999. Dahlman and Frischtak, 1990). 
Particularly, industrial structural changes resulted from Import Substitution Industrialisation 
policies maintained and strengthened the role of imported technologies and subsidiaries of 
foreign firms in the indigenous technological development. Dahlman and Frischtak (1990) 
observed that by 1960 more than 50% of the total goods manufactured in Brazil were 
produced by subsidiaries of foreign corporations.  They also refer that the government create 
the research infrastructure to improve technological capabilities and develop a local supply 
chain to support the production facilities of foreign subsidiaries and national state-owned 
firms. More recently, Quadros et al (2001) and Costa and Queiroz (2002) argue that local 
foreign subsidiaries accounted for the largest share of private R&D activity in Brazil, which 
activities concentrate in the adaptation of products and processes to the local endowment.  
According to them, there has been a ‘moderate’ improvement in Brazilian firms’ 
technological capability after the Brazilian government shift from Import Substitution 
Industrialisation policies to Liberalisation policies during the 1990s, although local 
subsidiaries of foreign firms are still important inovators. 
 
2.2 The Technological Capability Approach 
More specifically to the firm level, another relevant literature regards learning and 
technological capability accumulation experienced by firms in industrialised countries. This 
literature highlights the trajectory of capabilities accumulation during the industrialisation 
phase focusing in the idea that technological change is endogenous or internal to the firm. 
Moreover, learning dynamics does not have only an endogenous own character but it has also 
elements of capturing external innovation through technology transfer, among other forms. In 
this way, efforts for technological adaptation associated to internal learning processes act 
upon the rhythm of acquisition of competencies, which can occur due to the characteristics of 
the external technology transferred (Oliveira, 2005; Fransman, 1984).  
Research about technological capabilities accumulation is based on the evolutionary 
perspective of innovative efforts undertaken by firms. Since the 1980s this perspective has 
been developed considering firms as differing and dynamic organisations as well as stores of 
knowledge (Nelson and Winter, 1982). The evolutionary perspective also considers that firms 
evolve over time when they attempt to adapt themselve  to their environment. This adaptation 
process has implications to the path of technological capabilities accumulation, which is 
related to the main characteristics of the innovative activities within firms, being uncertain 
and path-dependent on their knowledge base. Following this perspective, technological 
capabilities refers the dynamic and competence building activities firms undertake to generate 
new products, processes and services.  
There are a variety of definitions for technological c pability. Earlier studies consider 
technological capability as the systematic efforts for acquiring knowledge to improve 
production capacity (Katz, 1976). Other studies refer to the "capacity to manage technology 
and to implement technical change" (Bell, 1984:189).  Some others include in the concept the 
ability of individuals, and infrastructure and activities undertake to implement changes in 
production and techniques (Figueiredo, 2003, referring to the studies of Bell, 1982; and Scott-
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Kemmis, 1988).  There exist some concepts that limit t to the ability of individuals and 
ignore their organisational context (Pack, 1987; in F gueiredo, 2001). Broader than Pack's 
definition, Enos (1991) refers to the technical knowledge necessary to achieve a common 
organisational objective that is embodied in the mind of engineers and technicians. Both 
definitions focus heavily on individuals as the locus of technological capabilities neglecting 
important organisational aspects that these capabilities integrate (Figueiredo, 2001). 
In fact, based on previous studies, most literature about industrialising countries refers to 
technological capabilities as the ability to absorb, use, adapt, improve and change existing 
technologies. This ability involves the effective use of technological knowledge in 
production, investment, and innovation (Westphal, Kim and Dahlman, 1985). A central role is 
given to firm's in-house technological learning efforts to master new technologies, adapting 
them to local conditions, diffusing, and exploiting them by exporting (Lall, 1992). At this 
stage, it is important to make the distinction between types of technological capabilities that 
refers to distinct processes of learning.  
In developing a framework for distinguishing between the forms of technological 
development experienced by South Korea, Westphal, Kim and Dahlman (1985) refer to three 
types of technological capabilities: production, investment and innovation. Production 
capability consists in the ability to operate production processes and adapt them to changing 
market circumstances. Investment capability refers to the skills for expanding and establishing 
new production facilities. Innovation capability consists in the ability to carry out activities 
for creating and implementing changes in techniques and organisational processes. They 
argue that technological development is costly because it requires stable and long term 
investments in skills and technological knowledge as well as improvements in organisational 
processes for learning to adapt imported technologies. 
Drawing on Westphal, Kim and Dahlman (1985), Lall (1992) developed a framework for 
explaining firm-level differences in technological capabilities. The framework considers 
technological capabilities as divided in two types: investment and production, which 
innovative activities vary according to the degree of complexity from simple routine to 
adaptive and innovative. Adding to previous work, Lall argues that production capability is 
not only the ability to operate and improve imported production techniques but include the 
firm's in-house efforts in engineering for absorbing technologies, as well as linkages with 
other organisations. Linkages capability refers to the ability to transmit technological 
information and receive it from other organisations, such as suppliers, consultants, customers, 
service firms, and universities. These linkages are supposed to assist the firm to improve its 
productive efficiency and also the diffusion of technologies (Lall, 1992).  
Kim (1997) also examined the process of technological capabilities accumulation experienced 
by Korean firms developing a "learning model" of acquisition-assimilation-improving foreign 
technologies. He considers technological capability as the ability of firms to utilize 
technological knowledge in an efficient manner in order to assimilate, use and adapt existing 
technologies. It has three main elements: production (management, engineering and repair 
and maintenance); investments (training, project development and implementation); and 
innovation (basic and applied research, development of new products, processes and 
services). The accumulation of technological capabilities took place in Korean's firms from 
imitation of foreign technologies, such as through reverse engineering and technology 
transfer, to innovation based on firms' internal efforts to develop and produce new products to 
the market.  
Based on this research, more recent studies examined technological capabilities in a different 
spectrum: from the analysis of internationalisation of innovative capabilities (Ariffin, 2000) to 
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explaining the differences between the process of accumulation in firms (Figueiredo, 2001). 
Drawing on Lall (1992) and Bell and Pavitt (1995), among others, Ariffin (2000) and 
Figueiredo (2001) consider two types of technological capabilities according to the activities 
for generating and managing technical change undertak n by firms: routine capability and 
innovative capability.  
Routine capability refers to the firm's ability to utilize knowledge, technologies and undertake 
activities in distinct functions: product, production and organisational processes. Innovative 
capability permits the creation, modification or improvement of these functions. In fact, their 
routine capability refers to the first level of technological capability, defined by Lall (1992) 
as, experienced-based capability.  Innovative capability, according to Lall, refers to the 
second and third levels of complexity, defined as, search-based and research-based. This 
distinction is important for explaining the path of technological capabilities accumulation 
experienced by firms in industrialising countries, which are building up capabilities from 
routine to innovative levels.  
The literature reviewed so far analyses technological capabilities accumulation by basically 
examining distinct aspects of learning efforts undertaken by large firms, which are national 
champions, foreign subsidiaries, state-owned firms or recently privatised firms that are 
acquiring foreign technologies. These firms have to actively invest in the development of 
skills, knowledge and experience for learning and consequently building up technological 
capabilities. Their learning efforts change over time according to the technological 
complexity of products and production. This literature thus highlights the importance of 
deliberately invest in learning to build up technological capabilities.  It does little, however, to 
discriminate the dynamic process of technological capabilities accumulation in small and 
medium size firms supplying to complex system manufcturer, as it is the aeronautic industry 
located in an industrializing country.  
 
2.3 The Analytical Framework 
Based on the literature reviewed, the broad analytic l framework used for organizing the 
reflections about the innovative behaviour of Brazili n firms supplying to the Aeronautic 
Sector is shown in figure 1. At the centre of our reflections we consider the relationship 
between technological change (left side) and technological capability accumulation (right 
side). In fact, technological change is related to the level of technological capability of firms 
and to their linkages with other firms and research institutions (Lall, 1992; Fransman, 1984).  
We consider in the paper, domains and levels that are relevant to the analysis of technological 
change and technological capability in the Brazilian Aeronautic Sector based on interviews 
and visits to firms, and on previous research (Oliveira, 2005; Marques, 2004; Bernardes and 
Oliveira, 2002; Bernardes, 2000, 2000a and 2000b; Frischtak, 1994 and 1992).  The domains 
considered in the framework are product, production (process and equipment-related), and 
organisation of project management and design procedures.  
Particularly, technological change consists of the introduction in the firm of technology 
embodied in the three domains (based on Bell and Pavitt, 1993). It can be related to the 
introduction of completely new technologies to the firm or to adaptations in the already 
existent product, production and organisational processes. This research classification is thus 
based on three levels of impact of the change in the firm (see Annex 1). The incorporation of 
substantially or completely new technologies in anyor all of these three domains belongs to 
high-level impact. Changes incorporated in product, production and organisation for 
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improving and upgrading the already existent technologies refers to middle-level impact.  
Finally, the duplication of technologies already in utilisation by the firm associates to low-
level impact. It is important to stress that the changes may be inter-connected in the sense that 
a change in product may influence changes in production, which may call for changes in 
organisational processes. This inter-connection has not been explored in this paper. 
Technological capability is defined as the ability of firms to manage and generate 
technological changes, i.e. their ability to innovate (Bell, 1984). The domains are product-
centred, production (process and equipments), and organisational processes (project 
management and design procedures). Product-centred technological capability consists in the 
ability of firms to innovate in product design, specifications and quality. Production 
technological capability is classified in two domains: production processes and production 
equipments (machinery, equipments and software). Organisational centred technological 
capability regards the ability of firms to manage and generate changes in project management 
and design procedures. 
Technological capability is classified in two levels: routine technological capability and 
innovative technological capability. Routine technological capability is the ability of a firm to 
utilize and adapt knowledge to implement changes in the distinct domains, which has two 
levels: basic and pre-intermediate (see Annex 2). In fact, this level is related to the production 
capability of firms, whereas innovative technological apability permit to create, modify or 
improve techniques. There are two levels for the latt r capability: intermediate and advanced.  
 
Figure 1 – Analytical Framework 
Moreover, we examine some aspects of the Brazilian Aeronautic System of Innovation, which 
are historical development of the sector in terms of g vernment support, launch of new 
products, and linkages among actors in the system. Particularly regarding to the classification 
of linkages, we consider it may be: procurement of services and goods; collaborative 
agreements for generating technological changes; and technology transfer.  
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3. The Brazilian Aeronautic System of Innovation 
 
The Brazilian Aeronautic Sector is one of the most important high technology sectors in the 
country. The evolution of this sectoral system of innovation was examined in Marques 
(2004), which set out the background for the development of this section.  Moreover, the main 
objective here is to examine how the Brazilian aeronautics has been developed since the 
foundation of Embraer in 1969. Using a historical approach, this section will give an 
overview of the steps followed by Embraer to become the world third producer of regional 
jets seating from 45 to 108 passengers. Therefore, section 3.1 briefly explores important 
features in the period pre-foundation of Embraer  (before 1969). Then, section 3.2 examines 
the main characteristics of the three phases in which as been possible to identify more 
explicit industrial development policies: (i) starting-up (1969-1978); (ii) seeking the 
international market (1979-1994); and (iii) post-privatisation of Embraer (1995-2002).  
Finally, the general market characteristics are described in section 3.3.  
 
3.1. The Brazilian Aeronautic Sector in the period before 1969 
The period before 1969 can be examined taking in consideration three important periods of 
development of the Brazilian Aeronautic Sector. The first period was during the 1910 to 
1930-decades. According to Dagnino and Proença (1989), the first and remote step for 
developing an aeronautic sector in Brazil was in the 1910-decade when Santos Dumont, a 
Brazilian industrialist, developed the first heavier-than-air flying machine. Although some 
investments were done in this period, Brazil lacked ngineering and technological 
capabilities, as well as the government policies, that such industry required. Then, the efforts 
done had not resulted in any significant development of the Brazilian Aeronautic Sector. 
The second period was during the Second World War (1935-1945). Brazil, as an allied of the 
USA, functioned as a producer of attack aircrafts. During this time, the American Air Force 
trained Brazilian pilots and formed aeronautic engineers for helping in the production of 
aircrafts. Brazil produced approximately one aircraft/d y for the USA during this time 
(Dagnino and Proença, 1989). Although more government efforts were done than in the first 
phase, they were not sufficient for setting up the basis for the sectoral economic growth. The 
lack of technological and engineering capability to design and produce airplanes in Brazilian 
continued. At that time, the production was restricted to light aircrafts for utilization in 
agricultural matters. 
Therefore, the Brazilian Army Force decided to create an aeronautical institute to form highly 
qualified engineers for supporting the infant aeronautic sector. The Technological Institute of 
Aeronautics (ITA) was founded by the end of the 1940-decade, which marked the beginning 
of the third period. ITA was founded with support of MIT and NASA. ITA formed 
approximately two hundred engineers until 1970 but the most part were contracted for 
working in other sectors due to lack of companies to contract them in the aeronautics 
(Bernardes, 2000a; Dagnino, 1993; Dagnino and Proença, 1989).  
During the 1950-decade, the Brazilian Army Force was aware that it was also necessary the 
creation of a research centre for applying aeronautic engineering knowledge to the 
development of a “Brazilian aircraft” that could fly according to the particular endowment 
and characteristics of the Brazilian territory.  They founded the Aerospace Technical Centre 
(CTA) that absorbed ITA and developed other institutes for aeronautic research. The main 
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research project at CTA was for the design and production of a 19-seats aircraft. The 
Brazilian Ministry of Aeronautics contracted an entire research group from Germany that 
worked with Brazilian engineers from ITA with the aim of developing such aircraft. The first 
prototype flew in 1959 and further improvements were necessary. In 1969, the project was 
then concluded and the first aircraft called Bandeirante could be produced. This group of 
researchers founded the first state-owned aircraft producer in Brazil in 1969, Embraer, with 
support of the Brazilian Ministry of Aeronautics (Bernardes, 2000a; Dagnino, 1993; Dagnino 
and Proença, 1989). 
 
3.2. The Brazilian Aeronautic Sector from 1969 to 2002 
 The starting-up phase begun in 1969 when the Brazilian Ministry of Aeronautics founded 
the Empresa Brasileira de Aeronáutica S. A. Embraer. The aircraft producer was created as a 
spin off of the CTA, with the objective of supplying the Aeronautic Command with parts, 
components, and training and attack aircrafts (Dagnino and Proença, 1989; Coutinho and 
Ferraz, 1993; Bernardes, 2000a).  According to Frischtak (1994:602), ‘although the 
production of airplanes in Brazil dates back to 1910, when the first monoplane was built in 
the country, the development of the Brazilian passenger aircraft industry can be equated with 
the development of Embraer’.  The main civil aircraft produced during the 1970s was a 
nineteen-seat light twin-engine turbo propeller (Frischtak, 1992; Bernardes, 2000a). 
The Ministry of Defence was the main buyer and also gave strong tax incentives and 
subsidies to Embraer for developing production and technological capabilities to manufacture 
the nineteen-seat aircraft (Dagnino and Proença, 1989; Coutinho and Ferraz, 1993; Bernardes 
2000a). These incentives were oriented for financing (through subsidies and tax exemption), 
marketing (through procurement and protectionism) and developing technologically (through 
the creation of special decrees for technology transfer and supporting research). In this first 
ten years of existence, the main market was national. 
According to Dagnino and Proença (1989), although the Ministry of Defence had heavily 
invested in the creation of a national aircraft supply chain (aircraft assembler and suppliers), 
approximately 68% of parts, components and sub-systems of aircrafts produced were 
imported. Nevertheless, some suppliers had developed capacity from the production of parts 
and components to the production of small aircrafts (1-10 seats), such as Aeromot (located in 
Porto Alegre, State of Rio Grande do Sul) and Neiva (Botucatú, State of São Paulo).  This 
development was possible due to the Ministry of Defence special programs for 
‘nationalisation’ of aero parts (systems, structural p rts and other components).  However, 
according to interviews at the Institute for Development and Coordination of the Aerospace 
Industry (IFI), low production scale, high quality, and high development costs of aero parts 
influenced the production concentration at the aircr ft producer itself. Few local supplier 
firms had developed the capacity to produce parts and components and they had relied heavily 
on technological transfer from CTA through IFI consultancy. Therefore, the most part of aero 
parts were imported in the end of 1978. 
The seeking international market phase corresponds to an increase in exports of small-body 
aircrafts (10-30 seats) that happened after the American market de-regulation in 1978 
(Coutinho and Ferraz, 1993). Therefore, the second phase corresponds to the period when the 
market changed from National to foreign.  A thirty-seat advanced twin-engine turbo propeller 
aircraft was the main commercialised product during this phase. According to Frischtak 
(1992:13) ‘At end 1990, [the thirty-seat aircraft] market share in the 20-45 seat category was 
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25% worldwide, just slightly below of its major competitor (the SAAB SF340). In the U. S. 
market, [it] had the dominant position in that year in terms of the total number of aircraft in 
service, again for the 20-45 seat category’.  
The launching of the eight-seat twin-engine turbo pr peller pressurized aircraft in 1979 is the 
starting point of this phase in the development of he Brazilian civil aircraft manufacturing 
(Frischtak, 1994; Bernardes, 2000a). This aircraft was the first one entirely undertaken by 
Embraer, for which the market was not mainly the Brazilian Air Force but American large 
corporations. It was a business aircraft designed to attend the American market. The aircraft 
producer undertook the product development, financed it, and designed and manufactured the 
pressurized system (one of the main innovations in this model) (Frischtak, 1994).  It was the 
first aircraft developed using the concept of communality or ‘family’. The second in the 
family was the thirty-seat aircraft, which was launched in 1981 for supplying the USA and 
Latin American market (Frischtak, 1992). 
The ‘nationalisation’ of aero parts program that begun in the starting-up phase stopped almost 
completely in this phase. The phase of ‘denationalisation’ had begun as well as the aircraft 
producer focus on technological development at international market standards.  Another 
important characteristic of this phase is the increasing reliance on imported systems, structural 
parts, among other parts, components and sub-systems. The new market demanded many 
improvements in digital technologies, new materials, sophisticated software, among other 
technological developments that the local suppliers could not adopt. Local suppliers had 
lacked government incentives and economies of scale for this technological upgrading.  And, 
the Ministry of Defence have reduced the budget to IFI, which decreased significantly IFI 
support for the technological development of local suppliers.  
The recession in the international civil aircraft market and the Brazilian government 
decreasing procurement and subsidies had been the main factors affecting the financial crisis 
of the aircraft producer in the beginning of the 1990s (Bernardes, 2000a; Bernardes, 2000).  
The company was thus privatised in 1994. Many small and medium size local Brazilian 
suppliers exited the market due to the economic recession in 1990-1994. 
The most important products in the post-privatisation period have been the ERJ 145 jetliner 
and the ERJ 170 jetliner. The ERJ 145 jetliner has the basic platform of the thirty-seat 
advanced turbo propeller but incorporates new technologies in avionics, propulsion and 
aerodynamics, and was launched in 1995. The ERJ 170 jetliner first ‘roll-out’ was in 
November/2001 and the first flight was in 2002. Both aircrafts have been developed within 
the concept of family or commonality (Oliveira and Bernardes, 2002). 
Summarizing, the Brazilian government has supported th  civil aircraft manufacturing in all 
stages of its development basically through (Green, 1987; Bernardes, 2000a): (1) research and 
development policies; (2) joint government-private ownership; (3) protection of home 
markets; (4) export development policies. However, at least one important question is: did the 
government efforts be successful in terms of increasing international competitiveness of the 
civil aircraft manufacturing? 
 
3.3. General characteristics of the Brazilian civil aircraft market 
According to Dagnino (1993), Donângelo et al (2000) and Bernardes (2000a) the Brazilian 
international civil aircraft market is mainly the U. S. and Europe, although there are 
investments for increasing the participation of China and Asia. During the 1970s and 1980s 
the main market however was the Brazilian, which imports were restricted by the “Law of 
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Similars” (Chapter III, Section V of Decree-Law No 37, as implemented by Decree No 61,574 
of October 20, 1967) that was part of the Import Substitution Industrialisation policies (Green, 
1987).  Then, Embraer was granted the monopoly for pr duction and commercialisation of 
aircraft turbo-prop with more than 8 seats. Piper was the only foreign competitor of Embraer 
that was selling in the Brazilian market due to a licence agreement signed between them 
before the Law of Similars was implemented. During this period, the main competitors of 
Embraer in the U. S. and Europe were: De Havilland, Cessna, Fairchild, Piper, Saab, BAe, 
Dornier, Fokker, and Canadair.  
By the end of the 1980s and during the 1990s, some civil aircraft manufacturers exited the 
civil aircraft market, such as BAe, Cessna, Saab, and Fokker, among others; while others 
merged or were acquired, such as Fairchild-Dornier, and Bombardier-Canadair. Fairchild-
Dornier filed for bankruptcy in 2002. Since the 1990s, the main international competitor of 
Embraer is Bombardier-Canadair that is called Bombardier Aerospace. Bombardier is the 
third largest world producer of regional jets while Embraer is the world’s four largest with 
45% share of the regional jet market in 2000. The fierce competition between the two 
companies led them to complain at The World Trade Organization on unfair subsidies given 
by the Brazilian and Canadian governments. Bombardier complains that Embraer’s jets are 
less technologically advanced then their jets and is o ng well in the market due to the lower 
labour costs, cheap Brazilian currency, and the Brazilian government subsidies. Embraer 
complains that Bombardier’s jets are subsidised by the Canadian government low loan rates. 
The WTO complains started in approximately 1998 and is still going on (Padgett, 2003).   
The main civil aircraft models manufactured by Embraer are shown on table 1. Therefore, 
Embraer’s market segment ranges from small turbo-prop seating 8 to 30 passengers, which 
are the models developed during the 1970s and 1980s; and medium size jets seating 35 to 108 
passengers. They fly specifically short hauls or regional routes, mainly linking hub routes and 
small airports. As*Vc is the performance indicator hat represents the number of seats (As) 
multiplied by the speed (Vc). It is considered by Mowery and Rosenberg (1981) an important 
indicator of performance development. Table 1 show that there is a substantial increasing in 
the aircraft performance since the launch of the ERJ 145 jetliner. 
 











1972 EMB 110 
Bandeirante 
19 22,500 413 Light twin turboprop 7847 
1979 EMB 121 Xingú 8 26,000 450 Twin turboprop 
pressurized 
3600 
1983 EMB 120 Brasília 30 30,000 555 Turbo propeller 16650 
1995 ERJ 145 50 37,000 833 Twin turbofan (jet) 41650 
1995 ERJ 140 44 37,000 833 Twin turbofan (jet) 36652 
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1998 ERJ 135 37 37,000 833 Twin turbofan (jet) 30821 
2002 ERJ 170 70 37,000 870 Jet 60900 
2004 ERJ 190 98 37,000 870 Jet 85260 
2005 ERJ 195 108 37,000 870 Jet 93960 
Source: websites - http://www.embraer.com, and http://www.airliners.net/. Information gathered in January 
2001. 
 
By the end of the 1980s, the Brazilian government started a process of opening up the 
national market and changed the macro policies from Import Substitution Industrialisation to 
Liberalisation. It reduced substantially the subsidies given to Embraer and there was no longer 
import restriction for small regional aircraft as it was in the previous period. Embraer, which 
was controlled by the Ministry of Aeronautics, was sold to private companies in 1994.  
Nowadays, the main market of the Brazilian aircraft manufacturing is foreign, which 
accounted for approximately 72,5% of the turnover in the year 2000. AIAB (2001) observed 
an increase in the total exports from U$ 0,70 billion n 1997 to U$ 2,50 billion in 2000 (table 
2). As a consequence, there is a rise in the participa on of the aircraft industry in the Brazilian 
GDP, measured by the total turnover divided by the total GDP, which jumped from 0.29% in 
1997 to 1.06% in 2000. Embraer corresponds to about 80% of the total Brazilian aeronautic 
sector. 
The economic performance of Embraer has been positive since 1997: the turnover increased 
from U$0.29 billion in 1996 to U$4.6 billion in 2005. In fact, exports accounted for most part 
of the turnover that grew from U$0.13 in 1996 to U$3.2 billion in 2005. Following that 
growth, employment has increased from 3,849 people in 1996 to 12,622 people in 2005. 
Nowadays, Embraer responds for approximately 2% of the total Brazilian exports3. 
Embraer implemented many changes during the period 1996-2005. Important changes were 
concerned with management of project development, rlationship with suppliers as well as 
procurement. At the same time, a reduction in production cycle or from starting production to 
the phase-out occurs from eight months in 1996 to five months in 2000 (Damiani, 2001). In 
this context, local suppliers, which have been mostly subcontracted for supplying pieces and 
parts, assembly jigs and tools and engineering projects, may accomplish with tidy delivery 
time and high quality standards. For doing so, they ma  accomplish with Embraer's technical, 
quality and financial requirements. The procurement unit is auditing the supplier once or more 
a year and monitoring the accomplishment with these r quirements. Local suppliers are then 
implementing and correcting the suggested items in the auditor's report.  Nowadays, the most 
parts of Embraer’s suppliers are foreign: imports accounted for U$1.73 billion. 
 
 
4. Research Methods 
 
Firms were selected using purposeful sampling. As opposed to probability sampling, the logic 
and power of purposeful sampling is to select information-rich cases from which it is possible 
to learn about issues of central importance to the purpose of the research (Patton, 1990; Yin, 
                                               
3 Information gathered from Bernardes (2000a) and Embraer reports to investors at www.embraer.com.br in 
August 2006 . 
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1994). The main issue that this thesis is concerned with is accumulation of technological 
capabilities experienced by Brazilian SMEs in the Brazilian aeronautic sector. SMEs are firms 
with less than 500 employees as defined by the Brazilian Institute for Geography and 
Statistics (IBGE).  
The selection of the local SME suppliers was done in two stages: the pilot phase and the main 
fieldwork. In the pilot phase, a catalogue of firms from the National Aerospace Industry 
Development and Co-ordination (IFI)4, called CESAER 2001, were surveyed to 
produce/collect information about the composition of the Brazilian local suppliers in the civil 
aircraft industry.  Thirty-one local Brazilian firms out of 98 were primarily selected. After 
that, the results were compared with the sample survey of a Brazilian research on the 
aeronautic system of innovation, co-ordinated by Roberto Bernardes, Jose E. Cassiolato and 
Helena Lastres, and financed by the Brazilian FINEP5, and checked with Embraer's 
procurement unit and with Roberto Bernardes. Then, 12 SME suppliers of Embraer were 
selected for in house interviews and visits to their plant. Embraer and 5 subsidiaries of foreign 
first tier suppliers of Embraer were interviewed and visited. Based on the research interviews 
and double checked with Embraer, the production chain structure was built as showed in 





                                               
4  IFI is an institute of the Technical Aerospace Centr  –CTA. 
5  FINEP – Financiadora de Estudos e Projetos (Finance of Studies and Projects) is a foundation of the 
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Figure 2 – The supply chain structure of Embraer (2002) 
Source: own elaboration based on the research. 
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Embraer is the main buyer and aircraft system integrator, i.e. firms that design the product and 
integrate its components, which outsource manufacturing and design activities seeking to 
leaner their organisational structures. Outsourcing these activities requires close inter-firm 
interaction and co-ordination at the knowledge and organisational level (Brusoni and 
Prencipe, 1999).  Few firms compose the first tier in this supply chain, which are foreign 
firms with the exception of Embraer that produces airframe structure.  These first tier firms 
are joint developing the aircraft models with Embraer nd are also system integrators. The 
only Brazilian supplier in the second tier is Eleb, a producer of landing gear sub-systems, 
which has participated in joint development projects with Embraer and foreign suppliers of 
Embraer.  Local SME firms supplying in the chain are mostly in the third and fourth tiers, 
among the ones that are mainly supplying to all tier firms and are showed in the middle boxes 
in figure 2. They are all owned by Brazilian firms or individuals with the exception of Eleb, 
which shareholders are: Embraer (60%) and Liebherr A ospace - Germany (40%).  
The five subsidiaries of foreign suppliers located in Brazil are in the first tier supplying 
airframe structures and related systems, and propulsi n system.  Their activities in Brazil are 
mostly customer support and assemblage of airframe structural sections to Embraer. They 
were selected because their plants in Brazil resultd from the second Brazilian government 
efforts for "nationalisation" of the supply chain, which Embraer is responsible for undertaken 
efforts to attract foreign suppliers to locate in Brazil. The firms settled plants in Brazil are first 
tier suppliers that joint develop projects with Embraer. Their contact details were given by 
Embraer's technological development unit and double-checked with the procurement unit. 
 
4.1. Brief description of the sample of suppliers 
4.1.1 Local SME supplier firms 
This section aims at characterising the local SME suppliers interviewed in terms of their 
ownership, period of foundation, number of employees, market characteristics and product 
characteristics. Brazilian firms or individuals own all SME suppliers, although there is one 
firm that is a joint venture between Embraer and the German Liebherr Aerospace.  
 
The majority of local SMEs firms were supplying to the Brazilian market, particularly to 
Embraer and the Brazilian Air Force, which was approximately 80% of their market. There 
were two firms that entered the export market, which were only supplying to Embraer until 
the end of the 1990s.  These suppliers were exporting landing gear, motor glider, spare parts 
to Embraer aircraft models EMB-120 Brasília, and engineering consultancy in design, 
production and assemblage of airframe structural sections, particularly fuselage sections.  
. 
Product characteristics  
The majority of local SME suppliers were manufacturing fuselage parts and components 
(third and fourth tiers) using steel, aeronautic aluminium and composite materials, while two 
firms are producing parts to avionics in aluminium and composite material. The other parts 
and components supplied vary from nails and pieces to hydraulic components. One supplier 




Assembly jigs and tools are utilised as support to the assembling of fuselage sections as well 
as to the integration of fuselages to the airframe. Jigs and tools are also made-to-order for 
supporting prototype tests. They were made in steel and had electronic components to 
adjusting the jig or tool to the size of the fuselag  section and airframe.  
 
Engineering projects and consultancy was based on mechanic and aeronautic engineering 
knowledge. Specifically, local SME suppliers were dsigning airframe structural sections, 
parts and components, as well as defining their production specifications. Particularly 
engineering consultancy was giving to foreign suppliers of Embraer in Europe about design 
definition and production processes, as well as support in the integration of fuselage sections 
to the airframe. 
 
The software firm supplied enterprise resource planning (ERP), i.e. software utilised in the 
management of integration among all units of the firm, to a subsidiary of foreign supplier of 
propulsion system to Embraer. The development of the ERP was made in close integration 
with the customer as a team of technicians were working inside the customers' plant.  
 
4.1.2 Characteristics of foreign suppliers located in Brazil 
The main characteristics of the five subsidiaries of foreign suppliers interviewed are shown in 
the table below. The large majority were settled in Brazil in the period 1999-2001. They are 
assembling systems and airframe structures. They have also participated in the co-design 
arrangement with Embraer for developing the projects ERJ 145 and ERJ 170. Technical 
support to system integration in the airplane at the plant of Embraer was another activity 
undertaken by them. The subsidiary QF has not focused only in supplying to Embraer. In fact, 
this firm has overhaul and maintenance of turbines as the main market focus since it acquired 
the Brazilian manufacturer of engines called Celma. The Brazilian plant is one of the fewer 
GEAE that includes the development of processes for turbines maintenance.  
 
The other interesting case is TF that produces airplane structural sections to Airbus airplanes 
in Brazil. This firm transferred part of its European manufacturing activities to Brazil. 
Although there are non R&D or design activities locally, it is working for the implementation 
minor improvement activities in accordance with quality and other exigencies of Embraer. 
 
The other three cases are only assembling parts and components to the fuselage and interiors, 
as well as hydraulic system and flight controls, which are manufactured in their home 
countries. In fact, all subsidiaries had few Brazili n suppliers, which were mostly related to 






Table 2 – Characteristics of the subsidiaries of foreign suppliers of Embraer located in 
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Source: own elaboration based on interviews. 









This section comments briefly the results of our fieldwork.  Table 3 below classifies the 
SMEs according to the Annex 2. The results show that SME suppliers have mostly 
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maintained themselves in the supply chain by using their already existent basic routine 
technological capability to implement technological hanges. Fewer SMEs have upgraded to 
the pre-intermediate routine technological capability and even less moved to innovative 
intermediate. In fact, only one SME developed advanced innovative technological capability 
during the period 1970-2002. 
 
Furthermore, all firms mastered basic levels of technological capabilities in all domains: 
product-centred, production (process and equipment-rela ed), and organizational process 
(project management and design procedures). Most part of firms (Group 4) implemented 
technical changes utilising their existent basic routine technological capability, which 
associates to passive learning efforts. This means that they are able to manage the replication 
of specifications from customers, basic quality contr l, routine replacement of components in 
machinery, equipments and software, basic coordinatio  of project development and basic 
routine design procedures. From the sample of twelve firms, one SME maintained its pre-
intermediate routine technological capability, and three have accumulated technological 
capability in the period 1995-2002. 
 
The three local SMEs that built up technological capability, which are classified under the 
headings of Groups 1, 2 and 3, had pro-actively invested in learning in order to manage and 
generate technical changes in different domains. These firms are compared below considering 
the domains of technological capabilities accumulation in the period 1995-2002. The firm 
considered in Group 1 is Firm 5 that built up advanced technological capability in product-
centred innovation.  From mid-1980s up to 1994, this firm acquired intermediate 
technological capability in product for developing landing gear to Embraer aircraft models. It 
had also managed tests for improving production process, moving from basic to pre-
intermediate routine technological capability. During this period, efforts were made to 
improve the internal coordination of projects through managing team working, allowing the 
firm to master pre-intermediate level of technological capability in project management. 
 
From 1995 up to 2002, Firm 5 had a pro-active learning behaviour by investing in in-house 
R&D and partnership with customers and universities/research centres for product 
development, among other learning activities. The firm had also improved technological 
capabilities from: 
• pre-intermediate to intermediate in production process;  
• pre-intermediate to intermediate in the organisation of project management; 
• basic to intermediate in production equipment-related; and 




 Table 3 – Technological capability: number of firms by type and level 
Level / period 

























Product - - 1 - 2 1 1  1 2 7 9 
Production     -        
Process - - - - - 1 - 2 3 3 7 8 
Equipment 
related 
- - - - - 1 - 1 1 3 8 10 
Organisational 
processes 
            
Project 
management 
- - - - - 1 - 1 - 3 8 11 
Design 
procedures 








The local SME considered under the heading Group 2 – e.g. Firm 1 – built up intermediate 
innovative technological capability in product and pre-intermediate routine technological 
capability in production process. In reality, Firm 1 developed the two seats airplane AMT 600 
by utilising its intermediate innovative technological capability acquired in the period 1981-
1994 when it received technology transfer while working in a government project for 
replacing training airplanes. 
 
The other SME that built up pre-intermediate technological capability in production process 
was Firm 4, classified in Group 3. This firm undertook efforts for managing team working, 
training of employees and in-house tests for production process and product development 
since its foundation in 1995. It had also managed tsts for assuring quality control in 
production and implemented an ERP computer system.  
 
Considering the impact of technological changes imple ented by the SMEs suppliers (table 
4), all firms have implemented high-level. The technological changes were implemented 
mostly during the period 1981-1994 and 1995-2002. The latter was the period in which SMEs 
implemented high-level changes in all domains, although most firms implemented changes in 
product and production processes and equipments. It is important to say that two firms did not 
mention the implementation of any technological change in the period 1970-1980, while one 
firm implemented change high and middle levels in product in this period.  
 
Table 4 – Number of firms implemented technological changes by type and level 
Level / period 



















Product 1 3 7 1 3 6 - 1 1 
Production          
Process - 2 9 - 2 7 - 1 3 
Equipment 
related 
- 2 8 - - 5 - - 2 
Organisational 
processes 
         
Project 
management 
- 1 1 - - - - - - 
Design 
procedures 
- - 4 - - - - - - 
 
 
The research findings so far shows that there are diff rences in the level and domains of 
technological changes implemented by the SMEs compared to the level of capability 
accumulation. Particularly, local SMEs that maintaied their basic routine technological 
capability implemented mostly changes high, middle and low levels in production processes 
in the period 1995-2002. These changes related to the implementation of ISO 9000 standards 
and quality assurance procedures to accomplish witheit er Embraer requests or with a 
government program for promoting exports. They have generated and managed the 




The local SMEs that moved to more innovative levels of technological capability 
implemented mostly high-level technological changes in product, production and 
organisational procedures. Particularly, those SME that achieved advanced technological 
capability in product implemented high-level technological changes in project management 
and design procedures, which was not observed in the other firms. 
 
Moreover, the research findings suggest that differences among the four groups of SMEs refer 
to their market strategy. The group of SMEs that maintained their basic routine technological 
capability supplied mostly to Embraer, following Embraer requests and blue prints, whereas 
the other groups of SMEs also supplied to other customers, such as foreign firms and/or 
subsidiaries of foreign suppliers of Embraer located in Brazil. In particular, the SME that have 
built up advanced technological capability in product was largely affected by the development 
of Embraer itself. The accumulation of technological capability experienced by this SME was 
influenced both by its internal learning efforts and by its relationship with other firms and 
universities and research centres, as well as its par icipation in government programmes.  
 
According to the interviews, two firms did not implement any significant technological 
change in the period 1970-1980, while the one firm that did implement change in the period 
did so in product.  In the following period (1981-1994), the amount of firms that did not 
implement changes was as follow: 
 five firms - product and production processes; 
 seven firms - production equipment-related; 
 eight firms - organisation of project management; ad
 nine firms - organisation of design procedures.  
 
Regarding the period 1995-2002, all firms implemented at least technological changes in 
product and production equipment. The amount of firms that did not implement changes 
were:  
 one firm - product; 
 two firms- production process; 
 eleven firms - project management; and 
 eight firms - design procedures. 
 
Table 5 summarizes the direction to which the 12 sampled SMEs accumulated technological 
capabilities associating them to the level of technological changes implemented. The shadow 
boxes show that the majority of the firms implemented changes high, middle and low levels 
utilising the already existent basic routine technological capability. The four firms that moved 
to other levels of technological capabilities implemented technological changes levels high 
and middle in product and production process and equipment. Just one firm improved to 
intermediate technological capability in the organis tion of project management and design 
procedures in the period 1995-2002. 
 
 22
Table 5 - Classification of firms according to technological change and technological capability: level and period 
Technological Capability Level / period 
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High - - Firm 5 - Firm 5 Firm 1 
 












Low - - - - - - - - - - Firm 1 Firm 9 
Production             
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Continuation Table 5 
Technological Capability Level / period 

























Production             
Equipment related             
High - - - - - - - Firm 8 
 








Middle - - - - - Firm 5 - -  - - Firm 6 
Firm 7 
Firm 10 




            
Project 
management 
            
High - - - - - Firm 5 - Firm 5 - - - - 
Middle - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Low - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Design procedures             
High - - - - - Firm 5 - - - - - Firm 7 
Firm 9 
Firm 12 
Middle - - - - - - - - - - - - 




Figure 3 compares the direction and extent to which the SME suppliers have accumulated 
technological capability. The direction may be to managing and generating high-level impact 
technological change by maintaining the existent technological capability at one side; or upgrading 
the technological capability while managing the implementation of higher levels of technological 
change. The findings show four groups of SMEs:  
• Group 1: One firm that achieved advanced technological capability at least in one area, 
i.e. product-centred, production (process, equipment-r lated), or organisational processes (project 
management, design procedures), and implemented high-level technological change in at least one 
of these areas. 
• Group 2: One firm that built up intermediate technological capability in at least one of 
those areas explained in Group 1, and implemented high-level technological change in at least one 
of those areas. 
• Group 3: Two firms that built up pre-intermediate technological capability in at least one 
of those areas explained in Group 1, and implemented middle-level technological changes at least in 
one of those areas. 
• Group 4: Eight firms that implemented at least low-level technological changes in one of 
those areas explained in Group 1, and maintained basic technological capability. 
 




























Technological Capabilities Accumulation 
 
Group 1 
















 (4th tier) 
 
 25 
Table 6 shows the characteristics of linkages for each group of SME suppliers taking into 
consideration the sources of external knowledge, and linkages types, activities and impact. 
 
Table 6 – Comparison between the groups of SMEs and linkages 
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to the implementation 
of all technological 
changes 
 
In fact, linkages experienced by firms in Group 3 are similar to firms in Group 4, whereas the 
differences arise in the activities and impact of the linkages. First, firms in Group 3 are hiring 
experts, undertaking training outside the firm. Furthe more, their customers and suppliers helped in 
the implementation and management of technological ch nges, while specific work in the customer 
plant was undertaken as well as their technical support at Group 3 plants. Second, SMEs in Group 4 
had trained employees in-house on-the-shop floor since their foundation up to 2002. In some cases, 
Group 4 SMEs have employees working inside Embraer plant. Embraer trained these employees in 
areas related to the product and production quality ssurance, among other topics as safety and 
confidentiality. In this sense, Embraer was transferring technological information to local SME 
suppliers at the extent of their involvement working i side Embraer plant. Other research finding 
worth to mention is that local SMEs classified in Group 4 relied heavily in the technical assistance 






Differences between them and Group 1 are that this group was actively learning from Embraer and 
foreign buyers by participating in joint product development activities, which contributed to the 
implementation of technological changes mostly in product, project management and design 
procedures, and to the building up of advanced innovative technological capability. Other important 
linkages are with Brazilian and foreign universities and technological centres for researching and 
training employees. As in the case of Group 2, it relied more in the acquisition of blue prints, 
specifications and technical assistance from foreign buyers, engine supplier and universities than to 
Embraer.  Moreover, it has received technology transfer from foreign firms when participating in the 
Brazilian military government offset programs6. 
 
Particularly related to inter-firm linkages, although it is difficult to separate the influence of linkages 
with Embraer and other firms, the research findings suggested that linkages between Group 1 and 
Embraer contributed largely to the implementation of technological changes in product, production, 
and organisational processes. Moreover, its linkages to foreign suppliers of Embraer and foreign 
buyers contributed to the accumulation of innovative technological capabilities for generating 
changes in product and organisational processes. It is worth to mention that Embraer itself 
particularly influenced collaborative agreements betwe n Firm 5 and foreign firms. Technology 
transfer from foreign buyers to Firm 5 had also an important impact in the innovative capability 
accumulation and it was related to some of the high-level technological changes implemented by 
this firm. In fact, the technology transfer was negotiated by the Brazilian military government in the 
end of the 1970s up to middle 1980s in offset programs. 
 
The distinction between Group 1 and Group 2 in terms of their participation in government offset 
programs refers to the extent the government funded and negotiated the technology transfer. In the 
case of Group 2, the government negotiated the technology transfer of seats production that was a 
field in which the firm had already technological capability; whereas in the case of Firm 5 the 
government funded and negotiated technology transfer for design and production of parts and 




6. Final comments 
 
To understand the technological capability accumulation and the role of linkages with national and 
foreign buyers, and research institutions in the Brazilian aeronautic sector involves a difficult 
exercise for perceiving changes in the innovative environment and in the supply chain. Initialy, the 
development of this sector was tied to the strengthening of CTA.  In the period pre-privatisation of 
Embraer, it was very important the participation of the national government through its 
technological policies for developing research capaity in the aeronautic field. The creation of a 
R&D environment together with tax incentives and government procurement turned possible the 
accumulation of technological capabilities experienced by Embraer, Firm 5 in Group 1, and Firm 1 
in Group 2. In fact, it was in the mind of the military government the importance of building up an 
environment that makes possible development and manufacturing of airplanes, particularly by 
creating a group of actors linked to: i) R&D in the space field; ii) R&D in critical technologies; iii) 
competence building; and iv) support to the certification of aerospace products and production. 
 
                                               
6 The offset programs of the Military government refer that foreign firms supplying to the government may transfer 





 At the same time, continuous R&D for developing new airplane models was undertaking by 
Embraer which turned possible the accumulation of expertise by the firm about all systems 
integrated in the airplane as well as about its suppliers. It is worth to remember that some important 
suppliers of technologies to Embraer were Aeromacchi, Northtrop e Piper. Partnership with these 
firms influenced Embraer innovative capability accumulation and, particularly, competence building 
to manage joint projects. However, the Brazilian macro economic crises lead the government to 
follow the international liberalization policies and, following that, the privatisation of Embraer. 
 
The organisation of Embraer’s supply chain changed drastically after its privatisation in 1994. The 
economic crises and the privatisation lead to a new b haviour of the firm regarding project 
management and the supply chain organisation. In fact, Embraer elaborated complex management 
architecture for moving up with its projects of jetliners. The management architecture involved 
reducing the number of first tier suppliers, and increasing collaborative agreements (co-design and 
risk sharing) with fewer strategic foreign suppliers. The Brazilian SME suppliers have not been 
incorporated in collaborative agreements, with the exception of the firm in Group 1. 
 
Finally, the study concludes that the interaction between SMEs and research institutions for 
implementation of technological changes that were new to the firms driven these SMEs to invest in 
engineering and testing/searching activities, inexist nt activities before the interaction. On the other 
hand, the activities undertaking with Embraer were more related to technological upgrading making 
use of existing knowledge base rather than for accumulating technological capabilities, with the 
exception of Firm 5. The interaction between SMEs and foreign buyers was also possible due to the 
existing knowledge base of the SME. These foreign buyers considered very important the tacit 
knowledge accumulated by these SMEs in the specific areas in which they were supplying to 
Embraer. The experience as suppliers of Embraer was very important to the foreign buyers, which 
were supplying systems and sub-systems to Embraer. Therefore, the foreign buyers had little 
influence in the technological changes the SMEs imple ented or in their accumulation of 
technological capabilities, with the exception of Firm 1 and Firm 5. Finally, it is important to 
emphasize that the few SMEs suppliers of Embraer that built up technological capability from basic 
production to more innovative levels (including learning by searching and by interacting with 
research institutions) constitute a special group of firms: they have, over time, been strategic to 
Embraer, engaged in military projects and very competitive in terms of international markets.  
 
In fact, the type of activities undertaken by the SMEs differed according to the novelty of the 
technological change to the SME. The completely new t chnologies called for interaction with 
research institutions (universities or technological centres) and searching and testing activities in-
house. Following that, product, production and organiz tional changes related to the improvement of 
existing technologies called for doing and adapting activities through close interaction with Embraer 
(national buyer) and foreign buyer. Embraer had also p ayed an important role in training employees 
of the SME suppliers. The results suggested there is a strong relationship between the novelty of the 
technological change to the firm and the type of activities undertaken with research institutions, 
national buyer and foreign buyer.  
 
Finally, we suggest that government policies for upgrading Brazilian SME suppliers in their supply 
chain positioning should take into consideration instruments to strengthening their technological 
capabilities. This is particularly relevant to the actual characteristics of the strategies of Embraer for 
managing the relation with suppliers. In fact, the strategies moved forward for managing suppliers 
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increased the internationalisation of procurement and participation in product development as 
observed in chapter 3. Furthermore, foreign suppliers are sharing product development activities as 
well as the necessary investments and returns. This be aviour poses another question referring to the 
lack of financial capabilities of Brazilian SME suppliers for sharing risks and product development. 
Following that, we also suggest that policy instruments should focus in stimulating the upgrading in 
the SMEs to completely new and more advanced technologies while forcing them to strengthening 
linkages with research institutions and implementing e gineering, project management and design 
procedures. 
 
Concluding, the Brazilian aeronautic system of innovation generally follows the loose characteristic 
of the national system of innovation, although there a e few exceptions of successful firm specific 
cases of tide linkages with research institutions, ational and foreign buyers, participation in 
government programs and innovative capability accumulation. Government policies, thus, should 
also focus on the diffusion of the innovation culture in the sector through the successful cases of 
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Annex 1 -  Technological changes: level and domain 
 
Technical Changes 
Production Organisational Processes 
Level of 
Impact Product 




Completely new process, 
for example, cell 
manufacturing, just in 
time, and standards (ISO),  
Completely new machinery, 
for example, 5 axes CNC 
machinery and laser 
machinery, new software for 
measuring 
Completely new project 
management process, such 




Completely new software 
for design, such as 










control step, test step, or 
another step in the already 
existent process,  
Upgrading in the 
specifications of the already 
existent machinery and 
software 
Implementing new steps in 
the already existent project 
management process 
Upgrading in the already 
existing software, or/and 
implementing new steps 
in the already existent 
design procedure 
Low 
Same product with 
improved painting  
and/or polishing 
 
Organizing the already 
existent process 
Same machinery and 
equipment 
Organising the already 
existent project 
management process 








Annex: 2 Framework for technological capability accumulation 
 
  
Technological Domains and Related Activities 
Production Organisational Processes Capability Level 
Product-centred 
Processes  Equipment Related Project Management Design Procedures 
Innovative Capability 
Advanced In-house R&D or/and in partnership 
with customers/suppliers and/or 
research institutes/universities 
substantially changing product 
design and/or specifications;  




In-house R&D for improving 
performance of machinery and 
equipments and for their new 
components; design and manufacture 
(machinery and/or equipments); 
software for attending specific 
demand 
 
In-house development of 
integrated project management 
techniques, involving the units: 
product development, production, 
finance, and marketing, among 
others 
Managing the 
development of co-design 
techniques involving the 
participation of 
customers/suppliers 
Intermediate Product engineering activities;  in-
house design and prototyping 
activities 
Engineering activities for 
adapting processes; systematic 
reverse engineering; continuous 
process improvement 
Managing the development of 
specific machinery and equipment 
definition for production by an OEM, 
including monitoring tests and 
training operators; preventive 
maintenance  
Team working for improving 
management of multi-firm 
projects and integration of 
product components 
Team working to improve 
design procedures  
Routine Capability 
Pre-Intermediate Managing tests and experiments in-
house to improve product quality 
Managing tests and experiments Managing tests and experiments for 
implementing minor adaptations in 
machinery and equipments and/or 
software, adjusting to new raw 
materials or to improve performance 
under international certification (ISO 
9000); own breakdown maintenance 
Team working for improving 
quality in the internal 
coordination of projects 
Managing quality control 
procedures in design 
Basic Replicating specifications; routine 
quality control; attendance of 
customer's requirements 
Routine production coordination 
across plant; basic quality 
control; replicating techniques 
Routine replacement of components 
in machinery, equipments; routine 
software upgrading; participation in 
installation and performance tests 
Basic coordination of project 
development for accomplishing 
with deadlines; routine 
management procedures 
Basic control of 
documentation; routine 
design procedures (basic 
CAD) 
Source: adapted from Lall (1992), Bell and Pavitt (1993), Ariffin (2000), Figueiredo (2001), and based on the research 
